Citations:recta ratio


 * 1677, Theophilus Gale, The Court of the Gentiles, part III: “The Vanity of Pagan Philoſophie Demonſtrated”, chapter ii: ‘The Vanitie of Philoſophie from its Mater, Parts, &c.’, § 4: « The vanitie of Ethics, Eph. 5. 6. 1 Cor. 1. 20. συφός », sub-§ 3: ‹ The Defects of Ethics, as to its Rule, which was ὀρθὸς λόγος ›, page 38
 * Whence theſe dark glimmerings of corrupt nature were generally ſtilted by the Platoniſts, as alſo by the Stoics, ὀρθὸς λόγος, right reaſon. Though indeed Plato now and then ſeems a little modeſt in acknowlegeing his ignorance, yet generally they ſuppoſed an ὀρθὸς λόγος, a right reaſon, which if wel improved might bring them to the ακμὴ, or top of their Moralitie. This right reaſon was in a more particular manner the Stoics (who paſſe for the greateſt Moraliſts) Diana or Godeſſe, as we find it excellently obſerved by Janſenius, in his Auguſt. Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 12. pag. 205. ‘The Stoics (ſaies he) and al other, who thought the offices of Virtue were to be deſired for their own honeſtie and pulchritude, made human reaſon, to which they thought this was moſt conſentaneous, Judge; and they would that ſhe as Miſtreſſe and Queen ſhould governe al; to whom, as holding the chief ſupremacie over the other parts of the Soul, al ſhould be obedient. For hence it is they ſo often crack, that the duties of Virtue are therefore honeſt and deſirable, becauſe they are conſentaneous to right reaſon: But in this mode of deſiring Virtue there lies hid the greateſt Pride; for that which terminates their appetite is their very Reaſon, as ſhe is the Queen and Empereſſe, and utmoſt rule of a good life. Whence it comes to paſſe, that whoſoever deſireth Virtue in this manner adores his own Reaſon as the Princeſſe which he ſerves, which without al peradventure is the worſhipping, and honoring, and taking complacence in himſelf.’ Here we may ſee whence the Scholemen borrowed their Recta ratio, right reaſon, which they make with the Philoſophers to be the Regula eſſe moralis, the rule of Moral Beings and Actions.